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Organizational and Ideological Strategies for
Nationalization: Evidence from European Parties
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Abstract
How does a party’s organizational structure affect its chances of becoming a na-
tional party? While existing explanations of party nationalization focus on country-
level institutional and societal variables, we argue that aspects of party organization
such as the degree of centralization of authority, ideological unity and leadership
factionalism also matter. By bringing the analysis to the party level, this article
provides a multilevel analysis of institutional and party organization variables and
disentangles the effect of each set of influences. We use original data on party or-
ganization and party nationalization for 142 parties across 20 European countries.
This research contributes to the literature on nationalization and party development
by advancing organizational strategies which parties could adopt in different social
and institutional environments.
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Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, European electorates and parties have
become increasingly nationalized due to a parallel process of modernization and
democratization (Caramani, 2004). Yet despite this nationalizing trend, significant
variation in nationalization remains both across and within countries in Europe
today. The goal of this article is to explain this variation by focusing on the role of
parties’ organizational and ideological strategies.
Understanding why parties are more or less nationalized in a country is impor-
tant for two reasons. First, the local or national character of parties influences
the nature of policies produced in a country (Jones and Mainwaring, 2003). Ac-
cording to Hicken (2009) and Rodden (2010) when political competition occurs be-
tween parties that represent specific sub-national constituencies there tends to be an
oversupply of pork-barrel policies and an undersupply of nationally-focused public
goods. In contrast, parties that have national programmatic appeals and national
electorates are more likely to enact progressive redistributive policies. Second, the
local or national character of parties may affect demands for secession and levels
of violent conflict within a country (Bakke and Wibbels, 2006; Brancati, 2009). As
Rose and Urwin (1975) note “geographically narrow parties are frequently accom-
panied by separatist goals, whereas parties with broad geographic support will tend
to have an integrating impact on the state and thus provide for a level of political
stability that would be absent without their presence” (Morgenstern, Swindle and
Castagnola, 2009, 1323-1324).
Existing literature attributes cross-country variation in party system nation-
alization to a variety of socio-structural and institutional explanations such as a
state’s centralization of authority (Chhibber and Kollman, 2004, 1998) and the con-
centration of that authority at the national level (Hicken, 2009). The concurrency
of legislative and presidential elections or the number of presidential candidates
(Hicken and Stoll, 2013; Amorim Neto and Cox, 1997; Cox and McCubbins, 1999)
also has an impact on nationalization and similarly do the presence of territorial
and ethno-cultural cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Cox and McCubbins, 1999;
Caramani, 2004). Yet despite the important inroads which explain cross-national
differences in party systems, we know very little about why parties within the same
country and the same institutional and societal context have different degrees of
nationalization.
This article explores this within country-variation by focusing on how parties’
internal organization affects their likelihood of spreading nationally. The argument
is as follows. We posit that from a party’s perspective becoming national has both
benefits and costs. The benefits are the increased chances of attaining office at the
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national level, while the costs relate to the difficulty of building a party organization
that has the resources, experience and ability to lure both candidates and voters
from a variety of different electoral constituencies. We argue that some parties are
more successful than others at solving this coordination problem. Drawing from
rational models of organization theory (Hatch, 1997; Mintzberg, 1990, 101), we
argue that in order to nationalize parties need strategies or large scale plans for
developing and competing in elections and good tactics to adjust to competitive
situations. The strategy involves managing the organization’s relationship with its
environment which takes the form of electors, electoral rules and party rivals. The
tactics employed within this strategy refer to how organizational resources such as
finance, members, infrastructure will be developed, acquired and used in order to
achieve the goal of nationalization.
In particular, we posit that the way in which a party is internally organized
in terms of centralization of authority, leadership factionalism, and heterogeneity
of their ideological platform matter for explaining their success in nationalizing.
Parties with centralized decision-making authority and absence of leadership fac-
tionalism should be better able to spread nationally because they can overcome the
organizational and collective action challenges of presenting candidates everywhere.
This effect should be particularly strong in federal or decentralized countries where
the collective action problems are particularly challenging. We also argue that ideo-
logically diverse parties are more likely to be nationalized because ideological flexi-
bility helps parties cater to a (potentially) diverse set of electoral constituencies and
lure voters across the territory. Ideological diversity is particularly important when
local interests in a country are salient, that is when preferences are geographically
concentrated and when the electoral system promotes local (instead of national)
interests.
We advance and test our claims with an original dataset that combines party-
level and country-level variables. The dataset contains measures of various aspects
of party organization for 142 parties in 20 European countries based on an expert
survey. Our analysis is unique because extensive comparative data on party orga-
nization is scarce. Some studies are comparative but not very recent (Janda, 1980)
whereas most recent studies are detailed country studies, qualitative comparisons or
regional quantitative comparisons (Boucek, 2003, 2012; Schumacher, de Vries and
Vis, 2013; Tavits, 2011). Furthermore, most research focuses on just one aspect of
party organization (usually party centralization or party organizational strength)
whereas we are able to study the impact of different aspects of party organiza-
tion such as the concentration of decision making (centralization), programmatic
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cohesion (ideological unity) and internal divisions (leadership factionalism).1 We
therefore focus on “formal” and relatively stable organizational features such as
centralization as well as on more transient organizational features such as leader-
ship factionalism and ideological unity, which are more likely to change over time.
The last two features are a reflection of party coherence (Janda, 1980, 118) under-
stood as “the degree of congruence in the attitudes [ideological unity] and behaviour
[factionalism] of party members.” We consider ideological unity both as an ideolog-
ical and an organizational characteristic of parties as it relates to the ideological
congruence of party members and representatives. Our dataset also contains mea-
sures of party nationalization for each of the 142 parties in the dataset as well as
various country-level societal and institutional variables.
This article contributes to the literature on parties empirically through this
new dataset, and theoretically, by placing emphasis on party organization as a key
explanatory variable. For quite some time studies of parties and party systems have
neglected the role of party organization,2 but recent studies suggest that it might
be an important dimension to understand a variety of political outcomes such as
electoral success (Janda and Colman, 1998; Tavits, 2011; Greene and Haber, 2015;
Ishiyama, 2001), changes in party policy position (Schumacher, de Vries and Vis,
2013) and the number of parties in a party system (Chhibber and Suryanarayan,
2014).3 Within this recent research agenda, this article is the first to investigate
how party organization affects the territorial nature of parties’ electoral support.
It is also one of the few studies that looks at how party-level factors interact with
social and institutional variables in explaining political outcomes. Finally, the article
contributes to the literature on nationalization by bringing the analysis down to the
party-level and addressing previously unexplained within-country variation.
1The Political Parties Database Project is another ongoing data collection project based on official
documents such as party statutes which will contribute to providing more fine-grained comparative data
on party organization. See Scarrow and Webb (2013) for a description of the project.
2There are some notable exceptions such as the work of Janda who wrote widely on party organization
and its effects on party performance (Janda and Colman, 1998).
3Kernell (2013) has written on party organization and political participation and Meguid (2008)
explores how party organization explains decisions to decentralize the state among mainstream parties
in the UK. Other scholars consider individual aspects of organization (Rahat, Reuven and Katz, 2008;
Janda and King, 1985; Rahat, 2009; Rahat and Hazan, 2001; Norris, 1996; Hazan, 2002) such as decision
making and candidate selection or democratic centralism which increases the probability of a party split
(Ceron, 2015).
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Conquering Space: Argument and Hypotheses
Why do individual candidates competing in their own district decide to coordinate
across districts to form a broad nation-wide party? According to several scholars the
answer to this question has to do with the incentives associated with gaining control
of the central government (Cox and Knoll, 2003; Cox and McCubbins, 1999; Hicken,
2009). Regardless of whether individual candidates (or local parties) are office seek-
ing or policy-seeking becoming national has obvious rewards since it increases the
chances that such a party will gain representation at the national level and that the
candidates within the party will have access to the power and resources associated
with office, and the ability to influence policy. Yet, despite these incentives, not all
political parties are fully nationalized.
Figure 1 presents the variation in party nationalization for 142 parties in 20 Euro-
pean countries. Each boxplot represents the distribution of parties’ nationalization
scores for the election year 2007 (or the closest national election after that year).
Higher values of party nationalization (y-axis) indicate that a party’s vote share is
equally distributed across constituencies in a country; lower values indicate that a
party’s vote share comes mostly from one (or a few constituencies) and thus its sup-
port is territorialized).4 The boxplots suggests that there is considerable variation
in the extent to which parties are nationalized within countries (as well as across
countries). With the exception of Sweden (where all parties are national in scope),
European parties in our dataset have very different degrees of nationalization.
We posit that not all parties are national because despite the considerable ben-
efits associated with the decision to form a national party, there are also significant
costs which not all parties are ready to overcome with an adequate strategy. Be-
coming national –that is “conquering space”5–requires overcoming two challenges.
The first challenge is organizational. Developing a national party requires individual
candidates to construct an organization with sufficient resources, experience and co-
herent decision-making to present their own candidates in the rest of districts in the
country and/or to lure candidates from other districts to compete under their party
label. This presents a collective action problem, which is akin to the one Aldrich
(1995) identifies in the creation of “the first national, mass-based party in history”
[97] – the Democratic party. According to Aldrich (1995), Van Buren’s main chal-
lenge in trying to revive the Democratic party was “securing the participation of
other elective office seekers, office holders, and benefit seekers who commanded the
extensive resources necessary to join his plan and create this new Democratic party”
4Details on the measurement of this variable are provided in subsequent sections.
5The term “conquering space” is taken from Caramani (2004).
6
Figure 1: Party Nationalization Across and Within Countries
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
P
a
rt
y
 N
a
ti
o
n
a
liz
a
ti
o
n
A
u
s
tr
ia
B
e
lg
iu
m
C
z
e
c
h
 R
e
p
u
b
lic
D
e
n
m
a
rk
F
in
la
n
d
F
ra
n
c
e
G
e
rm
a
n
y
H
u
n
g
a
ry
Ic
e
la
n
d
Ir
e
la
n
d
It
a
ly
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
rg
N
o
rw
a
y
P
o
la
n
d
P
o
rt
u
g
a
l
R
o
m
a
n
ia
S
p
a
in
S
w
e
d
e
n
S
w
it
z
e
rl
a
n
d
U
K
[104]. In other words, successful nation-wide parties require a broad based organi-
zation with substantial resources and enough candidates to field in every electoral
district.
The second challenge is electoral. To become a national party it is not sufficient
to build a nation-wide organization that has the resources to present candidates
everywhere; the party also needs to be able to win everywhere. In other words,
a successful national party is one that obtains a relatively even electoral support
across all districts in the country. This is challenging from an ideological point of
view since preferences across districts can be potentially very diverse.
Our argument focuses on party strategies as a response to these two challenges
of nationalization. We argue that the way in which a party is internally organized
with regards to the extent of centralization, leadership factionalism, and ideological
heterogeneity has an impact on the resolution of these challenges and thus on the
likelihood that a party will become nationalized with regards to its electoral support.
Specifically, we try to isolate the effect of organization on party nationalization. We
do not exclude the possibility of a dynamic relationship between these two sets of
variables across time but in this paper we focus mainly on one causal line from
party organization to party nationalization. Furthermore, we argue that parties
do not operate in a social and institutional vacuum but rather respond to their
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environment. Henceforth we posit that these party organization variables interact
with several contextual factors to explain success in nationalizing. The “strategic
fit” (Hatch, 1997) in order to achieve nationalization is therefore the successful
party strategy which aligns the needs and demands of the institutional and electoral
environment with those of the party organization. In what follows we develop our
hypotheses.
Centralization of authority
Organization theory stipulates that “control of others offers organizations pre-
dictability which is necessary to produce outputs and to coordinate actions ”(Czaniawska-
Joerges, 1988, 2-3). Similarly, for parties, strong decision-making from the centre
helps them develop and better coordinate campaigns in order to be successful across
constituencies. According to Duverger, highly centralized parties tend to be more
successful in mobilizing votes, which explains the “superiority of ‘modern’ mass-
membership organizations, adopted by leftist parties, over the loose caucus-type
organizations of older, more conservative parties” (Janda and Colman, 1998, 620-
621). Furthermore, Duverger connects party centralization not only to electoral
success but also to nationalization, although he does not fully explain the mecha-
nisms of this connection: “the increased centralization of organization within the
parties and the consequent tendency to see political problems from the wider, na-
tional standpoint tend of themselves to project on to the entire country the localized
two-party system brought about by the ballot procedure” (Duverger, 1954, 228).
We posit that centralization of authority within the party leads to nationalization
because party leaders are the ones most interested in attaining office at the national
level, and nationalizing is a means to achieve national office. Recent research argues
that party leaders in leadership-dominated parties (i.e. centralized parties) are more
oriented towards political office (and reaping the benefits of that office); whereas
party leaders in activist dominated parties (i.e. decentralized parties) tend to be
more responsive to activists and less worried about office (Schumacher, de Vries
and Vis, 2013, 2). Similarly, Strom (1990) states that the more decentralized the
party is in its decision-making, the “more policy-oriented the party becomes at the
expense of office or vote seeking” [577]. If this is the case, in centralized parties it
is more likely that the preferences of national party leaders will be implemented,
which means it is more likely to expect a strategy of spreading nationally, in order
to subsequently reap the benefits of national office. In contrast, a decentralized
decision-making process opens the door to preferences of activists and rank-and-
file party members, which are less interested in national public office and more
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interested in policy. This leads to the following hypothesis:6
H1. Centralization of authority within a party increases the likelihood
that the party will be nationalized.
Leadership Factionalism
The other organizational feature which can help a party overcome the electoral and
organizational challenge is unity around party leadership. Consensus and support
for the party leader exercises influence over members and can influence their be-
haviour which subsequently helps party coordination across districts. There are var-
ious types of factionalism - leadership, issue, ideological (c.f. Janda 1980) amongst
which we consider leadership factionalism to be detrimental to party nationalization
because its presence can increase a party’s coordination costs across constituencies.
Compared with centralization which is a more formal and stems from procedures
outlined in the party documents, leadership factionalism is a more transient or-
ganizational feature and relates more to the personality of the leader. Existing
research suggests that voters tend to go for the party label that portrays itself as a
united bloc, and divisions of leadership, lack of concentration of power and disunity
can bring electoral defeat (Schattschneider, 1942; McGann, 2002; Snyder and Ting,
2002). Consequently voters negatively associate factionalism with parties’ ability to
translate programmes into coherent policy (Boucek, 2003; McAllister, 1991) (Katz,
1980, 3) (Kitschelt et al., 1999, 136-137). We argue that leadership factionalism also
matters for nationalization (and not only for electoral success) because it makes it
hard for a party to agree on a coherent and expensive nation-wide strategy that
involves recruiting and presenting candidates in every electoral district. As Meguid
(2008) argues elite factionalism within parties reduces a “party’s ability to choose
electorally costly or resource-intensive strategies” [105]. As argued earlier, garnering
support from a variety of co-partisan and fielding candidates everywhere is a costly
activity for the party, and some of its leaders might not want to incur such costs.
We thus expect leadership factionalism to discourage nationalization.
6Some scholars have argued that party organizational strength (which is somewhat linked to party
centralization) might be associated with poor electoral performance. Tavits (2011) reviews these counter-
arguments explaining that “an extensive organization introduces strategic inflexibility (Levitsky 2003),
which may lead to party stagnation and loss of electoral support. Large organizations may become
inefficient and wasteful; they may put the party in a financial strain rather than helping keep down costs
(Scarrow, 1994)” (Tavits, 2011, 86). These arguments are concerned with electoral success, although one
might imagine that centralization could also potentially undermine nationalization due to similar reasons
of inflexibility and over-bureaucratization. We discuss this further in the results section.
H2. Leadership factionalism within a party decreases the likelihood that
a party will be nationalized.
Furthermore, we expect that the negative effect of leadership factionalism will
be strongest in countries that are federal (or very decentralized) since in these coun-
tries faction leaders are usually tied to territorial/regional constituencies where the
incentives to implement autonomous policy agendas rather than the national party
agenda are high (Leon, 2014; Golosov, 2016). In this context, leaders representing
certain constituencies and regions might not agree with a strategy of nationaliza-
tion, which would hinder its success. In contrast, in unitary countries, leadership
factionalism should not matter as much for coordinating across the territory since
competing leaders are not necessarily as tied to regional power bases. We thus
expect the following interactive hypothesis:
H3. Leadership factionalism x Political Decentralization: The negative
impact of leadership factionalism on party nationalization is larger in
decentralized countries.
In sum, leadership factionalism and low levels of centralization of authority
should constrain a party’s strategy to spread nationally. In contrast, parties with a
centralized decision-making structure and a unified leadership should give priority
to the interest of nationalization and should allow this decision to be implemented.
Ideological Unity
Political parties vary considerably in the degree to which their party platform is ideo-
logically cohesive. Parties are collective actors (Duverger, 1954; Sartori, 1976; Katz,
1980) and this introduces the possibility of intra-party differences and intra-party
conflict, which can be reflected in how the party presents itself ideologically to the
voters. Existing literature on parties has argued that ideological unity (or its con-
verse, ideological heterogeneity) affects a variety of aspects of legislative behaviour
such as agenda setting (Cox and McCubbins, 2005) and policy outputs (Tsebelis,
2002). In addition to this, we argue that ideological heterogeneity helps parties
nationalize. Autonomy in organizations involves a much needed degree of “flexi-
bility and creativity which is essential for adaptation to changing environments”
(Czaniawska-Joerges, 1988, 2-3). Following this logic, we argue that the extent
of flexibility with regards to ideological platform determines how well a party can
respond to both the electoral and organizational challenge of nationalization.
The catch-all literature (Hale Williams, 1009; Kirchheimer, 1966; Forestiere,
2009; Kirchheimer, 2008) has posited that in order to get more votes, parties follow
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a strategy of centering and widening rather than tightening their ideological profile.
We posit that a similar logic of ideological competition is at play when parties try
to spread nationally; in Caramani (2004)’s terminology, in order to become “catch-
all-over parties” (i.e. national parties) parties need to be “catch-all” and appeal to
a potentially very diverse set of interests across constituencies. We hypothesize that
greater ideological heterogeneity within the party should allow greater adaptability
to diverse local conditions and to a potentially diverse set of interests. The more
a party can respond to diverse ideological views across the territory the better po-
sitioned it will be to win votes across districts and thus to expand nationally. In
contrast, ideological unity should make it harder for parties to appeal to a broad
range of interests across electoral constituencies and to obtain nation-wide support.
We thus expect the following:
H4. Ideological unity within the party decreases the likelihood that a
party will be nationalized.
We think that ideological unity can have different effects in different arenas.
Our argument regarding ideological unity pertains mainly to party strategies in the
electoral arena as we posit that ideological heterogeneity might help parties garner
electoral support across the territory. However, we acknowledge that ideological
unity rather than ideological heterogeneity may be needed in the parliamentary
arena in order to generate high unity in roll-call votes which in turn may increase
a party’s electoral success and perhaps also further its chances for nationalization.
This would run against the effect of ideological unity in the electoral arena (at least
regarding party nationalization). This possibility does not invalidate our argument,
which is mostly concerned about parties’ organizational strategies in the electoral
arena, but it shows that parties are constantly faced with difficult trade-offs, and
strategies that might work well in certain arenas to attain certain goals (i.e. na-
tionalization) might not work in other arenas to obtain that same goal. The party
is thus faced with difficult choices.7
If the mechanisms of our argument regarding party nationalization are correct,
then we should expect the extent of ideological unity to matter especially when
local interests in a country are more salient since that is when parties need pro-
grammatic or ideological flexibility. Several factors in a country have the potential
to localize politics and contribute to the saliency of local interests and we focus on
two such factors: geographically concentrated diversity and an electoral system that
encourages a personal vote.
7We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out these contradictory effects of ideological unity
depending on which arena (and which goals) the party is focused on.
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Regarding the first factor, we expect the ideological make-up of the party to
matter most in this context of geographically concentrated socio-economic diversity.
If the party is ideologically heterogeneous it will be able to adopt differentiated
electoral platforms in order to win seats across the territory. By contrast, if the party
is ideologically unified in a context of concentrated diversity we expect it to do poorly
in some constituencies and thus its electoral support will be territorialized. As socio-
economic diversity becomes less and less geographically concentrated, the effect of
having an ideologically united party versus an ideologically diverse party should
be smaller or non-existent, since constituencies will have similar policy preferences.
This leads to the following interactive hypothesis:
H5. Ideological Unity x Concentrated Diversity : The negative effect of
ideological unity on party nationalization is larger when diversity in a
country is territorially concentrated.
In addition to a country’s societal make-up, we posit that electoral institutions
also territorialize or localize interests in a polity. As Carey and Shugart (1995)
argue, single member districts favour intra-party conflict and personalized politics,
which will deflect attention from a national message to a constituency message and
increase personal rivalries amongst candidates. Because this article is focused on
European political parties, there are very few countries with single-member districts.
Within proportional and mixed electoral systems however there is still significant
variation in the personalization of the vote and of candidates. In order to capture
such variation we focus on two variables related to the electoral system: district
magnitude and number of districts. Countries with low district magnitude and
large number of districts are likely to have more localized interests.
We thus argue that the negative impact of ideological unity on party national-
ization should be minimal (or disappear) when district magnitude is large and when
there are few districts since in these cases inter-district differences are smaller and
interests tend to be more nationally oriented (i.e. local issues are less important).
In contrast, the negative impact of ideological unity on party nationalization should
be particularly strong when the electoral system emphasizes local conditions and
local candidates, that is when district magnitude is small or there is a large number
of districts. This happens when average district magnitude is low.8 This leads to
the following interactive hypotheses:
H6. Ideological Unity x Average District Magnitude: The negative effect
8District magnitude, the number of districts and the electoral system more generally also have an
independent effect on the incentives of parties to coordinate across districts. In this article, however, we
care about the effect of ideological unity conditional on the electoral system.
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of ideological unity on party nationalization is larger in countries with
smaller average district magnitude.
H7. Ideological Unity x Number of Districts: The negative effect of ideo-
logical unity on party nationalization is larger in countries with a larger
number of districts.
In sum, if the goal is to spread nationally then parties are better off if they
allow for some ideological diversity within, especially when the country’s societal
and institutional make-up exacerbate the saliency of local issues. Although some of
the literature on ideological cohesion suggests that it is advisable to have an ideo-
logically coherent platform for the success of a party, especially for the achievement
of responsible party government (Bardi and Trechsel, 2014; Mair, 2013) this may
run against the electoral interests of some parties. Following the conflict between
responsible versus responsive duties of parties, we argue that ideological cohesion
can have drawbacks if the goal is to expand nationally (especially under certain
institutional and societal contexts).
Data, Measurement and Empirical Strategy
We test our hypotheses using an original dataset that includes both party level and
country level variables across 142 parties in 20 European democracies (see Table 4
in the online appendix for a list of countries and parties).9 This allows us to specify
and test a multilevel statistical model (MLM) that treats party as the level 1 and the
country as the level 2. We estimate a random intercept model (Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal, 2012; Gelman and Hill, 2006). Since variables constant within a country
cannot account for within-country individual party variations the MLM model offers
a test for both systemic and party level explanations.
9We exclude Netherlands and Slovakia because our measure of party nationalization is calculated as
the distribution of electoral support across electoral districts in a country, but these two countries only
have one electoral district (the country as a whole). However, we have conducted some robustness checks
to see if their inclusion would affect the results and it does not. We calculate party nationalization scores
for these two countries using their main administrative/territorial unit: 8 regions kraj in Slovakia and the
12 regions in the Netherlands. When including these two countries in the analyses (with this particular
operationalization of the dependent variable) our results remain unchanged. The one exception is that
the direct effect of leadership factionalism looses significance, which is not particularly concerning given
that our main theory is about the conditional impact of this variable and the conditional impact does
remain significant. We also exclude Greece and the Baltic countries because we do not have data on
party organization for these countries.
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Level 1
Party Nationalizationi, j, t = β0i, j, t-4 + β1 Ideological Unityi, j, t-4
+β2 Leader Factionalismi, j, t-4+β3 Centralization of Authorityi, j, t-4+β4 Party Covariatesj, t-4
Level 2
β0i, j, t-4 = γ0 Political Decentralizationi,j, t-4+γ1 Concentration of Diversityi,j, t-4
+ γ2 District Magnitudei, j, t-4 + γ3 Country Covariatesj, t-4 + µi,j, t
Our theory posits that party organizational factors (in interaction with contex-
tual factors) affect the likelihood that parties’ electoral support will become nation-
alized. Although we do not exclude the possibility that party organization could
change as a result of the extent of party nationalization, we believe that the direc-
tion of causality that we posit is more likely since party organization seems more
difficult to change (Harmel, 2002) than a party’s distribution of electoral support
and also because we believe that party organization changes more as a result of
poor electoral success, which as we show in the last section of this article, does not
equate with poor party nationalization.10 Still, in order to minimize potential issues
of endogeneity our independent variables are lagged several years with respect to our
dependent variable. Our independent variables are measured in 2007 because this is
the year for which we have data for the party organization variables,11 whereas our
dependent variable – party nationalization– is measured at the first national legisla-
tive election after 2007 for each country. Descriptive statistics for all variables are
presented in the online appendix.
Dependent Variable: Party Nationalization
Our dependent variable is party nationalization defined as the extent to which a
party’s electoral strength varies across the territory of a country. Highly nationalized
parties are parties that obtain a relatively even support across electoral districts in
a country, whereas territorialized parties are parties that obtain support only in one
or a few electoral districts in the country. We operationalize party nationalization
using Bochsler (2010)’s standardized party nationalization score which is based on
the Gini coefficient of inequalities to capture the extent to which a party’s electoral
support is equally distributed across constituencies. The measure ranges from 0 (a
party that receives 100 percent of its vote in one district) to 1 (a party that receives
10We further discuss aspects of possible reverse causality in the last section of the paper.
11A second wave of expert surveys is currently in the field.
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the same share of votes in all districts).12
For example, large centre-right and centre-left parties in Europe tend to have
scores close to 1 indicating that these parties are highly nationalized: Spain’s So-
cialist Party-PSOE (0.94), Norway’s Norwegian Labour Party (0.92), Italy’s Forza
Italia (0.91) and UK’s Conservative Party (0.9). However, nationalization is not
only reserved to large political parties. There are several smaller parties that are
also highly nationalized such as the Free Democratic Party in Germany (0.91), Fed-
eration of Greens in Italy (0.91), the Party of Italian Communists (0.91), the Greens
in Sweden (0.89) or the Greens in Germany (0.82). At the low end of our measure
(scoring close to 0) and capturing highly territorialized parties we find (not sur-
prisingly) some regionalist parties: Italy’s South Tyrolean People’s Party (0.05),
Spain’s Basque National Party (0.08), and UK’s Sin Feinn (0.2). Other regional-
ist parties, such as the Scottish National Party (0.37), have a slightly higher score
since they are successful in quite a few constituencies, but are still considered quite
territorialized. It is important to note however that not all highly territorialized
parties are regionalist parties. For example, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party
(MIEP) also has a very small nationalization score (0.12) and so do parties such as
Switzerland’s Labour Party (0.11) and Belgium’s Socialist Party (0.32).
This brief overview of the extent to which parties are nationalized in Europe sug-
gests two important points that we will emphasize throughout this article. First,
party nationalization in Europe is not necessarily correlated with party size.13 Al-
though large parties tend indeed to be quite nationalized, this is not always the case,
and we find a variety of political parties that are relatively small in terms of vote
percentage and that are quite nationalized in terms of having an even distribution of
votes across electoral districts. This suggests that party success and party nation-
alization should be treated as different dependent variables, and that explanations
of party success are likely to differ from explanations of party nationalization. Sec-
ond, territorialized parties are not always parties that are regionalist in terms of
defending the cultural or ethnic interest of a particular region. There are numer-
ous examples in Europe of non-regionalist parties that are territorialized since they
have an uneven distribution of votes across electoral districts. This points to the
fact that the explanation for territorialization of parties is not simply ideological.
Compared to various other measures of party and party system nationalization,
12See Bochsler (2010) for the precise formula to calculate the standardized party nationalization score.
We calculated these scores using Bochsler (2010)’s macro file for Microsoft Excel program available at:
http://www.bochsler.eu/pns/
13By party size we mean party electoral strength. In our dataset the correlation between party nation-
alization and party seat share is 0.58, so although there is clearly a relationship, it is not perfect.
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the advantage of Bochsler’s measure is that it weights the Gini coefficient for the size
of territorial units (i.e. electoral districts) within a country, and for the number of
districts in each country. This is particularly important when making cross-country
comparisons, and also because some of our independent variables (such as average
district magnitude) are correlated with the number of electoral constituencies in a
country. Table 5 in the online appendix presents a list of sources for computing the
nationalization measure and the election years for which data was collected.
Party-Level Independent Variables
Our key party-level independent variables are centralization of authority, leadership
factionalism and ideological unity. These variables were generated by the Party
Unity Study, an on-line expert survey conducted in 2007. Across countries, the
variation in the number of respondents ranged from 5 to 35.14 Generally, the ex-
perts agreed across our organizational measures and the standard deviation of their
responses was low (0.80). Their answers were aggregated by political party which re-
sulted in a final score being attributed to each party on all organizational variables.
The overall disagreement in the scores offered to each party is not dependent on the
number of survey respondents. This is substantiated by a very low correlation (0.11
at sig. 0.01) between the aggregated party score and the standard deviations of
expert responses for each party. Hence the reliability of our estimates is not related
to the number of respondents to the expert survey.
Compared to other expert surveys on party politics already conducted in Eu-
rope and considering that no financial incentives were offered, the expert survey
has received an average response rate comparable to other studies. Similar expert
surveys received an average response rate of 23 per cent in Eastern Europe and
32 per cent in Western Europe (Benoit and Laver, 2007). The Party Unity expert
survey received on average of almost 18 percent per cent from the Central East and
West European experts combined. Further details of the survey and exact question
wording are provided in the online appendix Table 7.
Our estimates of party organization variables have the advantage of providing de
facto information on the intra-party politics. Other studies, which focus on analyz-
ing party statutes have the disadvantage of reporting party organization from formal
documents, which may not be followed closely by the party.15 The indicators as we
describe them below, constitute three different aspects of party organization which
14The experts were party scholars specialized on each country, researchers and policy experts.
15For example, there is a high discrepancy between the official documents of FIDESZ in Hungary and
the practice of authority within the party. The latter is better reflected by the expert scores on party
centralization.
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do not always go together and are treated separately in our analysis. The associa-
tion coefficients are very low: centralization and ideological unity 0.14; leadership
factionalism and centralization -0.03; ideological unity and leadership factionalism
-0.39.
Centralization of power refers to the location and distribution of effective decision-
making authority within the party with regards to the top national party organs.
The concept captures the concentration of power at the central level and the top-
down decision making process with regards to various party affairs. Experts were
asked to assign a score from 1 to 5 to each party for the level of centralization in
general decision-making, selection of candidates, and the distribution of party fi-
nances where 1 means very low centralization and 5 means very high centralization.
With a high level of centralization was for example evaluated by the experts The
National Front (FN) in France or the Flemish Interest in Belgium. At the lower end
of centralization is the Green Party in France (score of 2.3) and also the Hungarian
Socialist Party (MSZP).
Ideological unity refers to the programmatic cohesion of parties in terms of their
overall ideology. A high score (maximum of 5) means that there is no conflict
amongst party members with regards to the overall ideology of the party while a
minimum score of 1 means complete disagreement over the party’s programme. In
our sample the level of ideological unity is not related to party family belonging
across Europe. For example, a high score of 4.5 in ideological unity is for example
attributed to the conservative oriented Popular Party (PP) in Spain, a similar score
of high ideological unity is attributed to right-wing party The Flemish Interest
(Vlaams Belang) in Belgium, and likewise a score of 4.3 was assigned to parties with
leftist orientation such as the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM).
Finally, leadership factionalism refers to the extent of divisions in the party
central office or in other words the intra-party groups organized around different
party leaders to act collectively as distinct blocs within the party. Experts rated each
party for the extent of factionalism based on the personal attraction of individual
leaders from 1 (none) to values of 5 (a great deal). At the low end of this variable
spectrum is a party such as The New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) in Belgium with a
score of 1.5 whilst at the higher end of the spectrum we find parties such as The
Green Party in France (score of 4). A moderate score of 3 on leadership factionalism
was assigned to the United Left Party in Spain. Leadership factionalism is a more
transient measure and reflects the extent to which party leadership is is divided and
the current party leader is being contested. 16
16This can happen in the context of both high and low party ideological unity. For example high
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In addition to these party organization variables, we control for two additional
party-level factors: regionalist party and party age. Our variable regionalist party
captures whether a party is regional or ethnic in nature based on the Chapel Hill
Expert Survey classification of party families (Bakker et al., 2012).17 We include this
control because political parties defending ethno-territorial groups are ideologically
motivated to compete only in a portion of the territory of a country (instead of
the entire country). We thus expect regional parties to be less likely to become
fully national. We also control for party age since we think that older political
parties have had the time to develop the necessary resources, experience and voter
attachments to successfully build nation-wide party platforms and are thus more
likely to be nationalized.
Country-Level Independent Variables
Concentration of diversity. Scholars have traditionally measured the amount of so-
cial diversity through fractionalization measures (Alesina et al., 2003), which capture
the number of ethnic, religious and linguistic groups in a country. These fractional-
ization measures however do not capture the extent to which social diversity over-
laps with geographic units in a country. To measure the geographic concentration
of a variety of key social cleavages (language, religion, income) we rely on Selway
(2011)’s CIMMSS dataset.18 For each social cleavage (language, religion, income)
Selway calculates the extent to which groups within that cleavage (i.e. language
groups within the linguistic cleavage) are identically distributed across regions or
districts in a country or whether each language group is concentrated in one region
or district.
For example, one such measure – “language-geography cross-cuttingness”– re-
flects the degree to which language and territory overlap: low values indicate that
individuals of language A mostly live in region 1 whereas individuals of language B
mostly live in region 2 (i.e. language and geography reinforce each other); in con-
trast, high values mean that individuals of language A are equally divided in terms
of the region where they live, and so are individuals of language B (i.e. language
leadership factionalism was present in 2007 in parties with low ideological unity such as the Civic Platform
in Poland (PO), medium unity such as the Democratic and Social Centre in Portugal (CSD/PP) or high
levels of unity like the Worker’s Party in Hungary (MUNK).
17The only change that we make to the Chapel Hill Dataset is that we include Germany since we
consider the CSU to be a separate party from CDU and a regional political party). Our coding of the
dependent variable treats the CSU as an independent party from the CDU (which it is organizationally)
and thus it appears to be very regionalized. In addition, the CSU has no intent in nationalizing since its
alliance with the CDU gives it national presence.
18https://sites.google.com/site/joelsawatselway/CROSS-CUTTING-CLEAVAGES-DATA
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and geography cross-cut). We invert Selway’s measures of cross-cuttingness (for
each of the three social cleavages) so that higher values indicate more geographic
concentration (i.e. more overlap between geography and groups within a cleavage)
and lower values indicate more geographic dispersion (i.e. more cross-cuttingness
between geography). We end up with three different measures: concentration of
language, concentration of religion and concentration of income, which we combine
into an index called Concentration of Diversity (which is the average of the three
measures).19 We log the index because its distribution is highly skewed.
Electoral system. We use two measures to capture the extent to which the
electoral system increases the saliency of local (as opposed to national) interests:
Average District Magnitude and Number of Districts. Our measure Average District
Magnitude comes from Beck et al. (2001) and it is the average district magnitude
of the House.20 Our measure of Number of Districts is based on our own calcu-
lations. Both variables are logged because their distribution is highly skewed. As
these two variables are highly correlated, we exclude the number of districts from
models reported in Table 1. Another key electoral system measure that is closely
related with district magnitude is a country’s threshold of representation, yet we
opted not to use this variable for two reasons: first, threshold of representation is
a more elusive concept than district magnitude or number of districts because it is
often operationalized as a combination of many different variables (district magni-
tude, number of districts, legal thresholds, size of the legislature...). Second, the
thresholds of representation in a country does not really capture the “localization
of politics” or the “saliency of local interests” which is the crux of our argument
presented.
Political decentralization. We use Hooghe et al. (2015)’s “representation” vari-
able from the Regional Authority Index dataset, which captures the extent to which
a country’s subnational tier is endowed with an independently elected legislature
and executive. Hooghe et al. (2015) code each regional tier in a country as follows:
0=no regional assembly; 1=an indirectly elected regional assembly; 2=a directly
elected assembly; 0=the regional executive is appointed by central government;
1=dual executives appointed by central government and the regional assembly; 2=
the regional executive is appointed by a regional assembly or directly elected. They
19We create an index of concentration of diversity because the three indicators from its composition
capture together diversity in different forms while they are not intercorrelated. In other words the index
tells us whether a country is experiencing some form of concentrated diversity across one, two or all three
dimensions and with which intensity.
20In mixed systems, the DPI dataset calculates the weighted average MDMH by first calculating the
average MDMH of each tier (number of seats/number of districts, for each tier), and then averaging these
averages, where each tier is weighted by the number of seats.
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then add up the scores for the assembly and for the executive for each regional tier.
In our sample the measures ranges from 0 (lowest levels of political decentralization)
to 5.7 (highest levels of political decentralization).
New democracy. We include a dummy variable indicating whether the country
is an old or new democracy. This variable takes the value of 0 for countries that
have recently transitioned to democracy, which includes third wave democracies
in Southern European and post-communist countries (Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain). We run some robustness tests with
an alternative variable –years of democracy– that measures the years since the last
democratic transition for each of our countries. We build this measure using the
POLITY dataset and we consider a transition to democracy when a country starts
having a polity score (new POLITY2 variable) of 6 or more. The results of our
analyses with this different operationalization hold.
Results
The empirical analysis proceeds in two stages. We first test the direct effect of
our party organization and contextual control variables, and then we test several
models including cross-level interactions between country-level factors and party-
level organizational features. Table 1 presents separate models that include only
party-level variables (model 1); only country-level variables (model 2) and both
party-level and country-level variables (model 3). The results from models 1 and 3
suggest that our three party organization variables have the expected effect on party
nationalization, although “party centralization” fails to reach statistical significance.
We predicted that ideological unity within parties is detrimental for spreading
nationally (H4) because it prevents parties from adapting to a variety of local con-
ditions. Table 1 indeed shows that ideological unity has the expected negative and
statistically significant effect on party nationalization. The significant effect of this
variable remains when we include our contextual variables in the analysis (Model
3).21 In many cases, a degree of programmatic unity is traded for uniform electoral
success across the country in order to appeal to more voters. For example, The
Greens in Germany, Venstre the liberal party in Denmark and the Civic Platform
in Poland are all illustrative cases of the negative relationship between ideological
21The effect of ideological unity maintains when controlling for party size measured as share of votes
and share of seats. Our argument and results hence show that in the electoral arena less ideological unity
contributes to party nationalization. Conversely, in the parliamentary arena, more ideological unity might
be required for a party to act as a unitary bloc in roll-call votes. As we explained in the theory section
this demonstrates that parties are faced with conflicting strategies in different arenas, which is something
worth exploring in future research.
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Table 1: Direct Effect of Party-Level and Country-Level Variables
Dependent Variable: Party Nationalization M1 M2 M3
Ideological Unity –.114*** –.109***
(.04) (.04)
Leadership Factionalism –.076** –.064**
(.03) (.03)
Party Centralization .050 .039
(.03) (.03)
Regionalist Party –.410*** –.390***
(.07) (.07)
Party Age .000 .000
(.00) (.00)
Concentration of Diversity (log) –.232** –.126
(.10) (.08)
Political Decentralization –.024 –.028*
(.02) (.02)
Average District Magnitude (log) DPI .033 .025
(.03) (.03)
New Democracy (dic) .005 –.042
(.07) (.06)
Constant 1.150*** .271 .966***
(.20) (.21) (.28)
No. of cases 142 145 142
No. of countries 20 20 20
sigmau .07 0.09 0.07
sigmae .20 0.24 0.20
Rho .09 0.14 0.09
Chi2 57.03 11.51 69.15
R2 0.32 0.15 0.39
Sig:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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unity and nationalization. They all have high levels of nationalization but exhibit
ideological heterogeneity. These findings are in line with the catch-all literature
following Kirchheimer (1966) whereby parties need to lose a bit of their ideological
package in order to appeal to a larger pool of voters. In contrast, parties that are
ideologically very cohesive tend to be less nationalized such as for example, The
Justice and Life Party in Hungary or the New Flemish Alliance and the Social-
ist Party in Belgium. Our results reinforce the importance of party programmatic
strategy for nationalization, especially with regards to flexibility in their ideological
platform.
We also stipulated that both centralization of authority and the absence of lead-
ership factionalism (i.e. control and leadership consensus) within parties should
increase the likelihood of a party being nationalized (H1 and H2). The results from
Table 1 suggest that “leadership factionalism” is indeed negatively associated with
nationalization (and statistically significant), which confirms the expectations of
hypothesis 2. Across our European sample we find high leadership factionalism in
parties with low ideological unity (such as the Civic Platform in Poland or the So-
cialist Party in Portugal) and also in parties with high ideological unity (for example
the Worker’s Party in Hungary or Reform Movement in Belgium). Considering the
positive impact of ideological heterogeneity and in line with our expectations, we
find that parties in the first group (high leadership factionalism, low ideological
unity) exhibit slightly higher levels of nationalization. This also points towards
a stronger impact of ideological unity on nationalization compared to leadership
factionalism as also shown by the coefficients in table 1.
“Party centralization” although positively associated with party nationalization
(as expected), is not statistically significant. In other words, party centralization
does not seem to influence the extent to which a party becomes nationalized. This
non-finding could be explained by the fact that our measure of “party centraliza-
tion” is a measure capturing three different aspects of centralization of authority
with potentially countervailing effects on nationalization. For example, whereas cen-
tralization of decision-making and centralization of resources might be positively
related to nationalization, centralization of candidate selection might actually be
negatively associated with nationalization since it might make the party less adapt-
able to diverse local constituencies and less appealing to new party elites.22 Our
data does not allow us to test whether these different dimensions of centralization
22In a study of the success of ethnic parties in India, Chandra (2004) argues that parties with a
centralized structure tend to fail because they are unable to incorporate new political elites. In contrast,
parties that have a more competitive procedure for selecting candidates (more decentralized parties) are
better able to broaden their elite profile and obtain more electoral success.
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might have different (and perhaps opposing) effects; but this is certainly an avenue
for further research.
Organizational and ideological strategies in context
The second step of our analysis examines how party organization variables are con-
ditioned by specific country-level institutional and societal factors. We capture
this conditionality through three cross-level interaction models presented in Table
2. Our first conditional expectation (H3) is that the negative effect of leadership
factionalism on nationalization should be particularly strong when countries are po-
litically decentralized. We capture this conditionality in model 1 which includes an
interaction between “leadership factionalism” and “political decentralization.” As
we cannot interpret the effect and the significance of the interaction term from the
coefficients in the table (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006), we plot the relevant
marginal effects in Figure 2.
Figure 2 shows that leadership factionalism has a negative and significant ef-
fect on party nationalization in highly decentralized and federal countries. The
negative effect increases as decentralization increases (for example, nationalization
is expected to decrease by 20 percentage points, when, in conditions of leadership
factionalism, we compare parties from a highly centralized country such as Luxem-
bourg with parties from a highly decentralized country such as Belgium).23 It also
shows that there is no statistically significant effect of leadership factionalism on
nationalization when the country is highly centralized. This is not due to the fact
that centralized countries are less likely to have parties with leadership factionalism;
in fact there is variation in leadership factionalism across all levels of political decen-
tralization.24 What it means is that in centralized countries, internal party factions
are likely to be less powerful and more nationally-oriented and thus likely to want to
pursue a national strategy. In contrast, in federal or decentralized countries factions
within parties are likely to have more power (due to the decentralized nature of the
state) and are likely to be concerned with their particular local or regional issues. In
decentralized or federal contexts then leadership factionalism will make it difficult
for a party to coordinate a national strategy across all territorial constituencies in
the country.
Our second set of conditional expectations are centred around the effect of ide-
ological unity on party nationalization. We argued that ideologically united parties
23The percentage of observations which fall within the significance area is 57.7
24The correlation coefficient between political decentralization and leadership factionalism is quite low
(0.17).
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Table 2: Models with Interactions
Dependent Variable: Party Nationalization M1 M2 M3 M4
Ideological Unity –.105*** –.248*** –.016 –.428**
(.04) (.08) (.09) (.20)
Leadership Factionalism .073 –.072** –.072** –.063**
(.06) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Party Centralization .045 .045 .048 .041
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Political Decentralization .076* –.029* –.024* –.025
(.04) (.01) (.01) (.02)
Concentration of Diversity (log) –.124* –.108 –.124 .558
(.07) (.08) (.08) (.42)
Average District Magnitude (log) (DPI) .031 –.209* .026
(.02) (.12) (.03)
Number of Electoral Districts (log) .085
(.10)
Leadership Factionalism × Political Decentralization –.045***
(.02)
Ideological Unity × Average District Magnitude (log) .065*
(.03)
Ideological Unity × Number of Electoral Districts (log) –.029
(.03)
Ideological Unity × Concentration of Diversity (log) –.172*
(.10)
Regionalist Party –.376*** –.371*** –.370*** –.388***
(.06) (.07) (.07) (.07)
Party Age .000 .000 .000 .000
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
New Democracy (dic) –.039 –.033 –.039 –.017
(.05) (.06) (.05) (.06)
Constant .603** 1.487*** .718* 2.199***
(.28) (.39) (.41) (.79)
No. of cases 142 142 142 142
No. of countries 20 20 20 20
sigmau 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.07
sigmae 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
Rho 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.11
Chi2 87.30 75.08 74.99 71.06
R2 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.41
Sig:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Leadership Factionalism
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Political Decentralization
should have a harder time appealing to a diversity of interests across electoral con-
stituencies in the country and thus should be less likely to become nationalized.
This negative effect of ideological unity on party nationalization should be particu-
larly strong for parties in countries where local interests are salient. We identified
three factors that contribute to the saliency of local interests in a country: geo-
graphically concentrated diversity, a low district magnitude electoral system and a
large number of electoral districts. We thus expect a significant interaction between
ideological unity and these contextual factors.25 This conditionality is captured by
the interaction terms in models 2, 3 and 4 in Table 2, and the relevant marginal
effects are plotted in Figure 3.
The top graph in Figure 3 presents the marginal effect of ideological unity (y-
axis) as district magnitude changes (x-axis). The graph shows that ideologically
united parties have a negative (and significant) effect on party nationalization es-
pecially among low-district magnitude electoral systems. This negative effect gets
smaller (but still significant) as district magnitude increases, which suggests that
as interests become less localized it is easier for parties to nationalize and their
ideological strategies matter less for nationalization. At very high levels of district
magnitude (DM(log)>2.7, i.e. DM>15) the effect of ideological unity becomes non-
25We also tried the interaction with a fourth contextual factor –political decentralization– as we believe
that to some extent it also captures the degree to which politics is localized. The results of this fourth
interaction are presented in the online appendix (Figure 6) and go in the expected direction of our theory.
25
Figure 3: Marginal Effects of Ideological Unity
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significant (since the confidence interval bands cross 0). The rug plot that overlays
the marginal effects graph suggests that a substantial number of observations lie
in the significant portion of the graph (about 78.07 percent of our sample), which
according to Berry, Golder and Milton (2012) is indicative of support for our hypoth-
esis. The middle graph also supports our expectations. It shows that ideologically
united parties have a negative (and significant) effect on party nationalization espe-
cially as the number of electoral districts increases above 11 (i.e. as politics becomes
more localized). In contrast ideological unity has no statistically significant effect
when there are few electoral districts that is when the electoral system promotes
national interests.
The bottom graph shows the marginal effect of ideological unity (y-axis) as the
concentration of diversity in a country changes (x-axis). Ideologically united parties
have a negative (and significant) effect on party nationalization, and this effect
becomes even stronger as a country’s diversity becomes more and more territorially
concentrated. This confirms what we expected because as a country becomes more
territorially diverse it becomes harder for parties to construct credible and effective
cross-district alliances. We also see that when a country is not territorially diverse
(that is when interests are not as locally diverse) the extent of ideological unity of
a party does not seem to matter.26 The rug plot suggests again that a substantial
percentage of observations lies in the region of significance (65 percent based on
our calculations). These results strongly confirm our expectations of the effect of
ideological unity on party nationalization and the mechanisms associated with this
effect.27 In order to provide some further robustness, we ran this same interaction
with alternative measures of geographic concentration of social diversity from Lublin
(2015)’s dataset and from Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011)’s dataset on geographical
segregation.28
26Note that the correlation coefficient between ideological unity and concentration of diversity is 0.08,
which means that there is variation in ideological unity in countries that are diverse and also in countries
that are not diverse.
27In fact, we would expect ideological unity to have a negative effect on party nationalization in
countries with both territorially concentrated diversity and an electoral system promoting local interests.
We tested this triple interaction (between the electoral system variables, highly concentrated diversity,
and ideological unity) and our expectations hold. Results for these analyses are available from the authors
upon request.
28Lublin (2015)’s dataset has a measure of the effective number of electorally relevant ethno-regional
groups (EREG) and Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011)’s dataset provides a measure of segregation for three
different cleavages (language, religion and ethnicity). When running our analyses with these alternative
measures our results hold. See Figure 7 in the online appendix.
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Alternative theories and robustness tests
Our theory explains that to become nationalized parties need to a) build a party
organization that can field candidates everywhere and b) win everywhere. Our
empirical focus in this article has been on the later – the nationalization of electoral
support, which we operationalize as the degree to which a party’s electoral support
is evenly distributed across electoral districts. However, building a nation-wide
party organization that fields candidates everywhere is a pre-requisite to obtaining
nation-wide electoral support, and one might wonder the extent to which these
dimensions are related and whether the same factors explain both aspects of party
nationalization.
We think that these two dimensions of nationalization are strongly related be-
cause the decision of parties to develop a nation-wide organization and field candi-
dates across the entire territory of a country is often determined by the expectation
that these parties have about whether they can win across the territory. If parties
think that they are unlikely to win votes across the territory, they will decide against
fielding candidates everywhere since that would mean wasting precious resources
without any electoral yield. This is similar to the strategic decision of political en-
trepreneurs in plurality systems, which explains intra-district coordination: parties
will decide not to compete in districts where they think they will not be competitive,
which helps reduce the effective number of electoral parties to two (at the district
level) (Duverger, 1954; Clark and Golder, 2006). So in most cases we should see a
strong relationship between the extent to which parties field candidates across the
territory and the extent to which parties obtain even electoral support across the
territory. Empirically speaking these two dimensions are indeed highly correlated
in our dataset (0.92), which means that in the vast majority of cases parties that
field candidates everywhere also tend to win everywhere.29
Yet it would still be interesting to test whether our party organization variables
29There are a handful of parties in Europe that are exceptions to this strong relationship between
organizational and electoral aspects of nationalization: Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZO), the
Finnish Christian Democrats (KD), the Hungarian democratic union (UDMR) in Romania, the Greens
in Germany and Labour in the UK. These parties field candidates across the entire territory of a country
but fail to win consistent support across the territory. The question of why parties might behave this way
is an interesting one, although not the focus of our article. For example, some traditionally nationalized
parties might have difficulty anticipating changes in electorate preferences in their country and find
themselves loosing support in certain regions of the country, while still fielding candidates everywhere.
This might account for the cases of the Labour Party in the UK or the Finish Christian Democratic
Party in Finland. Another potential explanation could be that some parties with mostly regional support
end up developing national aspirations and national organizational strategies by virtue of consistently
participating in government coalitions at the national level. This would be the case of the Greens in
Germany or the Hungarian democratic union (UDMR) in Romania, which field candidates everywhere
but only receive support regionally.
28
have a similar (or different) impact on the extent to which parties field candidates
across electoral districts. In order to do this we run our main analyses with a
different dependent variable measuring the percentage of territorial units where a
political party runs in elections. This measure (which we call territorial coverage)
is based on Caramani (2004, 61) and Bochsler (2010). The results of these analyses
are presented graphically in Figure 4 (the full regressions are presented in Table
8 in the online appendix) and suggest that our party organization variables simi-
larly explain fielding candidates everywhere and winning everywhere. This confirms
our expectation that the decision to field candidates everywhere is probably highly
influenced by the expectation that parties have formed about where they will win.
Figure 4: Marginal effects of cross-level interactions with territorial coverage as dependent
variable
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A second aspect of our theory that requires more careful examination is the
assumption that parties aspire to be major political players at the national level,
and that to do so they must garner extensive support across the territory of a
country. Yet parties defending ethno-territorial groups often have no aspiration to
fully nationalize. They are interested in gaining electoral support in a few districts,
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but not the entire country. In our analyses we account for this by controlling for
whether a party is regionalist or not. As expected, the regression results from tables
1 and 2 show that being a regionalist party has a large and statistically significant
negative effect on party nationalization. Yet despite the inclusion of this control
variable, our key theoretical story about the importance of party organization holds.
However, for further robustness we can run our analyses excluding all parties that
are regionalist. This reduces our sample (which is not ideal) but allows to show
that the exclusion of ethno-regional parties does not bias our results. Tables 9 and
10 and Figure 8 in the online appendix show that our main findings hold when
excluding all ethno-regional parties.
A third potential issue has to do with the distinction between our dependent
variable “party nationalization” and “party electoral success.” While recent schol-
arship on party organization has been mostly interested in explaining party electoral
success (Janda and Colman, 1998; Tavits, 2011; Greene and Haber, 2015; Ishiyama,
2001; Mylonas and Roussias, n.d.) our focus is on explaining party nationalization.
We argue that party nationalization and party electoral success are indeed related30
but they are not the same thing, and they should be theorized separately. Figure 5
shows a scatterplot of these two variables: a party with low levels of electoral success
might score very high on our measure of party nationalization because it has ob-
tained similar electoral results nation-wide. For example, in Sweden, the Worker’s
Party of Social Democrats (SAP) and the Environmental Party the Greens (MP)
have a similar high party nationalization score (0.88 and 0.87 respectively) but their
electoral gains in the 2010 elections were completely different (30.5 and 7.3 percent-
age points respectively). For this reason, we do not expect our argument to apply
to party electoral success.
Table 3 tests our base model with a party’s electoral success as the dependent
variable (instead of party nationalization), and it shows that neither “ideological
unity” nor “leadership factionalism” are statistically significant predictors of party
electoral success. However, we do find that “party centralization” is positively
and significantly related to electoral success: more centralized parties are more
likely to be electorally successful. This finding is in line with existing research
that suggests that organizational strength (Tavits, 2011) and domination by office
holders (Ishiyama, 2001) are positively related with good electoral performance. The
divergence of effects between electoral success and nationalization further confirms
that what drives party electoral success is not what drives party nationalization,
and that these outcomes should be studied separately.
30The correlation between the two variables in our dataset is 0.59.
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Table 3: Main model with electoral success as the dependent variable
Dependent Variable: Electoral Success M1 M2
Ideological Unity –2.292 –2.274
(1.87) (1.97)
Leadership Factionalism 1.750 2.533
(1.60) (1.70)
Party Centralization 3.898** 3.654**
(1.67) (1.76)
Party Age .067** .082***
(.03) (.03)
Regionalist Party –12.021***
(3.52)
Concentration of Diversity (log) .299 .315
(3.55) (3.68)
Political Decentralization –.816 –.961
(.66) (.70)
Average District Magnitude (log) .298 .376
(1.08) (1.17)
New Democracy (dic) –3.146 –4.292
(2.54) (2.80)
Constant 6.917 6.384
(13.25) (14.15)
No. of cases 137 124
No. of countries 20 20
Sig:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Figure 5: Scatterplot: Electoral Success and Party Nationalization
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Finally, a fourth potential issue has to do with the direction of causality since
there might be a reverse relationship between nationalization and party organiza-
tion. We do not exclude this possibility and we believe that this relationship requires
further exploration in a longitudinal study. To provide a first exploration of this
issue we have collected additional data on party nationalization for the election year
prior to 2007 (the year for which we have party organization data) and we have run
a few models with our party organizational measures as dependent variables. In
most models party nationalization is not significant, which lends less support to the
hypothesis of a different causal story. The only exception is the model in which
leadership factionalism is the dependent variable: party nationalization appears to
discourage leadership factionalism. This is not surprising since successful national-
ization means a successful coordination across districts which should increase the
prestige and power of party leadership inside the party rather than diminish it.31
The issue of reverse causation however requires further elaboration and investiga-
tion in a longitudinal study. What we can claim in our paper is that there is a
clear a strong relationship between the organizational features of political parties
and their nationalization of electoral support. Further research should disentangle
31Results of these models with a lagged party nationalization variable are available from the authors
upon request.
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exactly how this relationship unfolds over time.
Conclusions
This article provides the first empirical study of how parties’ organizational struc-
ture affects whether or not parties become nationalized. To this date the existing
literature has mostly focused on country-level variation in nationalization and on
institutional or sociological influences to the formation of nation-wide parties and
party systems. In contrast, we offer a party level approach to nationalization and
we posit that one has to investigate its variation across parties within the same
country and across countries.
We argue that party organization plays an important role in responding to the
challenges or costs of nationalization: the organizational challenge and the elec-
toral challenge. In particular we focus on three aspects of organization that are
commonly identified in organization theory and in the literature on political parties
(centralization of authority, leadership factionalism and ideological unity) and we
specify how they relate to these two challenges and to the ability of parties to spread
nationally.
We find that having leadership consensus (i.e. low leadership factionalism) is
key to overcoming the organizational challenge of recruiting and fielding candidates
everywhere and building a broad national party organization. This ‘strategic fit’
works especially when countries are already very decentralized politically. Second,
we find that ideological heterogeneity is key to overcoming the electoral challenge
of having to appeal to a potentially diverse set of interests. Consistent with this
argument we show that ideological heterogeneity helps parties nationalize. This
is another ‘strategic fit’ for an environment which includes geographically diverse
countries and/or countries with electoral systems that localize interests. In sum, if
the goal is to spread nationally then parties are better off if they allow for some
ideological diversity within (flexibility) while assuring that their leadership remains
fairly uncontested (i.e. leadership consensus). Finally, we do not find an effect of
party centralization on party nationalization, yet party centralization seems to be
a strong predictor of electoral success. This further supports our claim that elec-
toral success and nationalization, while related, are different concepts and require
different explanations.
This article contributes to the literature on party development on several fronts.
First, by bringing the analysis to the party-level and focusing on party organization
we are able to explain some crucial party-level variation in nationalization that had
33
been previously ignored in the literature. Second, our article opens the door to more
fine-grained analysis of the effects of party organization on political outcomes which
is in line with a relatively new research agenda and ongoing data-collection projects
on party organization. Third, this article opens the door to a less deterministic view
of party nationalization; one in which parties have some margin to affect the out-
come (constrained of course by their institutional and societal environment), and
where parties can change over-time if they decide to modify their internal struc-
tures. As Caramani (2004) suggests “[...] the erosion of territorial cleavages is not
deterministically a consequence of the general integration of societies, but also the
product of the action of parties and of their inherently competitive strategies” [6].
An area for future exploration would be to investigate the role of party organization
over time with time-series data.
Finally, it would also be interesting to extend this research outside of Europe
where comparable party organization data is available. Two issues should be consid-
ered here. First, we think that our theory on party organization and party strategy
best fits countries in which voter-party linkages are mostly programmatic. Part of
our argument for example assumes that parties appeal to voters (and voters consider
voting for parties) based on ideological platforms. More specifically we posit that
the extent to which ideological commitments made by parties are heterogeneous
or homogeneous has important consequences for whether voters will support these
parties across the territory. We are thus thinking about a world in which parties’
electoral strategies are programmatic, which means that our argument would travel
well to a series of other advanced industrial democracies such as Canada, Japan,
Australia and the United States.
However, we are less certain that our hypotheses would hold in more clientelistic
settings (i.e. India and Latin America) in which parties tend to have very different
electoral strategies and where voters expect very different things from parties.32
In these contexts, other aspects of party strategy and party organization might be
relevant to nationalization. Second, the European context in which we focus does
not have much variation on certain institutional variables (namely electoral systems
and regime type), so extending the analysis outside of this set of cases would allow
to see whether the theory holds across a greater variety of institutional settings.
We believe that it should hold, but it might be the case that certain institutions
(such as the presidency) could neutralize or diminish the role that party organiza-
tional and ideological strategy have in determining nationalization. Alternatively
a strong president could contribute to more leadership factionalism because of in-
32Recent literature Ziegfeld (2016) suggests that the dynamics of regionalization of party systems can
be very different in clientelistic settings than in programmatic ones.
34
ternal party competition generated by presidential elections. These are issues for
further research.
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Online appendix: Tables and Figures
Table 4: Countries and Political Parties
Country Party Name
Austria SPO (Social Democratic Party of Austria)
VP (Austrian Peoples Party)
GRUNE (The Greens)
FP (Freedom Party of Austria)
BZ (Alliance for the Future of Austria)
Belgium VLD (Flemish Liberal and Democrats)
SPA (Socialist Party.Different)
SPIRIT (The Flemish Left Liberals)
CD&V (Christian-Democratic and Flemish)
N-VA (New Flemish Alliance)
PS (Socialist Party)
VB (Flemish Interest)
MR (Reform Movement)
Czech Republic ODS (Civic Democratic Party)
SSD (Czech Social Democratic Party)
KSM (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia)
KDU-SL (Christian and Democratic Union)
SZ (Green Party)
ODA
CDH (Humanist Democratic Centre)
ECOLO (Ecologists)
FN (National Front)
Germany SPD (Social Democratic Party)
CDU (Christian Democratic Union)
FDP (Free Democratic Party)
Die Linke.PDS (The Left Party.PDS)
Bndnis 90/GRNE (Alliance 90/The Greens)
CSU (Christian Social Union in Bavaria)
Denmark V (Venstre, Liberal Party)
SD (Social Democracy)
DF (Danish People’s Party)
KF (Conservative People’s Party)
Continued
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Country Party Name
RV (Radical Left)
SF (Socialist People’s Party)
EL (Unity List- The Red Greens)
KD (Christian Democrats)
Spain PSOE (Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party)
PP (People’s Party)
IU (United Left)
ICV (Initiative for Catalonia Greens)
CiU (Convergence and Union of Catalunya)
ERC (Republican Left of Catalunya)
EAJ-PNV (Basque National Party)
CC (Canarian Coalition)
BNG (Galician Nationalist Bloc)
Finland KESK (Finnish Centre)
KOK (National Coalition Party)
SDP (Finnish Social Democratic Party)
VAS (Left Alliance)
VIHR (Green Alliance)
KD (Finnish Christian Democrats)
SFP (Swedish People’s Party in Finland)
PS (True Finns)
France UMP (Union for a Popular Movement)
PS (Socialist Party)
FN (National Front)
UDF (Union for French Democracy)
NC (New Centre)
PCF (French Communist Party)
VERTS (The Greens)
PRG (Radical Party of the Left)
MPF (Movement for France)
MRC (Citizen and Republican Movement)
RPF (Rally for France)
Hungary Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Prt)
FideszHungarian Civic Party (FideszMagyar Polgari)
Alliance of Free Democrats (Szabad Demokratk Szve)
Continued
44
Country Party Name
Independent Smallholders Party (Fggetlen Kisgazda)
Workers Party (Munksprt) MUNK
Center Party (Centrum) CEN
Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIP)
Ireland FF (Fianna Fail)
FG (Fine Gael)
LAB (Labour Party)
SF (Sinn Fein)
GP (Green Party)
PD (Progressive Democrats)
SP (Socialist Party)
Iceland SSF (Independence Party)
S (Alliance)
VG (Left-Green Movement)
FSF (Progressive Party)
FF (Liberal Party)
Italy DS (Democratici di Sinistra))
DL (Democrazia e Liberta-La Margherita))
PRC (Partito Rifondazione Comunista))
IdV (Italia dei Valori))
VERDI (Federazione dei Verdi))
FI (Forza Italia))
AN (Alleanza Nationale))
SDI (Socialisti Democratici Italieni))
RI (Radicali Italieni))
PdCI (Partito dei Comunisti Italieni))
UDEUR (Unione Democratici per l’Europa-Popolari))
SVP (Sudtiroler Volkspartei))
UDC (Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e di Centro))
LN (Lega Nord))
MpA (Movimento per l’Autonomia))
NPSI (Nuovo Partito Socialisto Italiano))
DC (Democrazia Cristiana per le Autonomie))
Luxembourg CSV (Christian Social Party)
LSAP (Socialist Worker’s Party)
Continued
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Country Party Name
DP (Democratic Party)
GRENG (The Greens)
ADR (Alternativ Democratic Reform Party)
Norway A (Norwegian Labour Party)
FRP (Progress Party)
H (Right)
SV (Socialist Left Party)
KRF (Christian People’s Party)
SP (Centre Party)
V (Venstre-Left)
Poland PiS (Law and Justice)
PO (Civic Platform)
SRP (Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland)
SLD (Democratic Left Alliance)
UP (Labour Union)
LPR (League of Polish Families)
PSL (Polish People’s Party)
Portugal PS (Socialist Party)
PSD (Social Democratic Party)
PCP (Portuguese Communist Party)
PEV (Ecological Party The Greens)
CDS-PP (Democratic Social Centre)
BE (Left Bloc)
Romania PSD (Social Democratic Party)
PC (Conservative Party)
PNL (National Liberal Party)
PD (Democratic Party)
PRM (Great Romania Party)
PUNR
UDMR (Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania)
Sweden SAP (Social Democratic Workers’ Party)
M (Moderate Rally Party)
C (Centre Party)
FP (Liberal People’s Party)
KD (Christian Democrats)
Continued
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Country Party Name
VP (Left Party)
MP (Environment Party The Greens)
Switzerland SVP (Swiss People’s Party)
SP (Social Democratic Party of Switzerland)
FDP (Freethinking Democratic Party)
CVP (Christian Democratic People’s Party)
GPS (Green Party of Switzerland)
EVP (Evangelical People’s Party)
LPS (Liberal Party of Switzerland)
EDU (Federal Democratic Union)
PdA (Labour Party)
United Kingdom LAB (Labour Party)
CON (Conservative Party)
LD (Liberal Democrats)
SNP (Scottish National Party)
DUP (Democratic Unionist Party)
PC (Playd Cymru)
SF (Sinn Fein)
SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party)
UUP
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Table 5: Information and Sources for Dependent Variable
Country Data Collected Source Districts
Austria 2008 Elections Resources33 9
Belgium 2010 EED34 Nuts 3 11
Czech Republic 2010 EED – Nuts 3 14
Denmark 2011 EED 10
Finland 2011 EED 15
France 2012 Ministry of Interior, France 565
Germany 2009 EED 16
Hungary 2010 and 2006 EED – Nuts 3 20
Iceland 2009 EED – Constituency 6
Ireland 2011 and 2007 EED – Constituency 43
Italy 2008 EED – Districts 27
Luxembourg 2009 Election Resources 4
Norway 2009 EED – Nuts 3 19
Poland 2011 EED – Constituency 41
Portugal 2009 EED – Districts 20
Romania 2008 EED – Nuts 3 42
Spain 2008 EED – Nuts 3 52
Sweden 2010 EED – Nuts 3 & Elections Resources 29
Switzerland 2011 EED – Nuts 3 26
UK 2010 Electoral Commission UK 650
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Table 6: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Party Nationalization 0.697 0.267 0.046 0.950 145
Ideological Unity 3.776 0.609 2 4.8 150
Leadership Factionalism 2.371 0.736 1 4.600 154
Party Centralization 3.613 0.631 2 5 152
Concentration of Diversity (log) -1.856 0.307 -2.348 -1.127 157
Political Decentralization 3.048 1.559 0 5.749 157
Average District Magnitude (log) (DPI) 1.974 1.039 0 3.114 157
Number of Electoral Districts (log) 3.416 1.291 1.386 6.477 157
Party Age 44.058 39.474 0 175 154
Regionalist Party 0.083 0.276 0 1 157
New Democracy (dic) 0.732 0.444 0 1 157
Table 7: Wording of Questions in Party unity Expert Survey in Europe
Variables Questions
Leadership factionalism Some parties have ”factions,” defined as intra-party
groups organized to act collectively as distinct blocs
within the party. Factions may pursue various objec-
tives. Please rate each party as of 2006/2007 for the
extent of factionalism based on the personal attraction
of individual leaders.
1-none 2- little 3- some 4- a lot 5- a great deal
Ideological unity On a scale from 1 to 5 please assign a score for each party
regarding its ideological unity (party programmatic co-
hesion) for the 2006/2007 period.
1 - 50% or less agreement 2 - Over 60% 3 - Over 70% 4
- Over 80% 5 - Over 90% agreement
Centralization Centralization of power refers to the location and distri-
bution of effective decision-making authority within the
party with regard to the top national party organs. As-
sign a score from 1 to 5 to each party for the level of cen-
tralization in decision-making, selection of candidates,
and the distribution of party finances as of 2006/2007.
1- very low 2- low 3- medium 4- high 5- very high
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Figure 6: Interaction ideological unity and decentralization
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Figure 7: Robustness using alternative measures of geographic concentration of diversity
-.
5
-.
4
-.
3
-.
2
-.
1
0
M
a
rg
in
a
l 
E
ff
e
c
ts
 o
f 
Id
e
o
lo
g
ic
a
l 
U
n
it
y
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8
Effective number of electorally relevant ethno-regional groups (Lublin 2015)
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
P
e
rc
e
n
t
-.
4
-.
2
0
.2
.4
.6
M
a
rg
in
a
l 
E
ff
e
c
ts
 o
f 
Id
e
o
lo
g
ic
a
l 
U
n
it
y
-4 -3.5 -3 -2.5
Segregation (Alesina and Zhuravskaya 2011)  
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
P
e
rc
e
n
t
51
Table 8: Cross-level interactions with territorial coverage as dependent variable
Dependent Variable: Territorial Coverage M1 M2 M3 M4
Ideological Unity –.140*** –.335*** –.033 –.550**
(.05) (.10) (.11) (.23)
Leadership Factionalism .049 –.071* –.081** –.061*
(.07) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Party Centralization .022 .025 .035 .021
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Political Decentralization .040 –.047* –.035* –.039
(.05) (.03) (.02) (.03)
Average District Magnitude (log) .090** –.247 .086*
(.04) (.16) (.04)
Number of Electoral Districts (log) .022
(.12)
Concentration of Diversity (log) –.058 –.041 –.062 .832
(.14) (.14) (.10) (.52)
Leadership Factionalism × Political Decentralization –.037**
(.02)
Ideological Unity × Average District Magnitude (log) .093**
(.04)
Ideological Unity × Number of Electoral Districts (log) –.032
(.03)
Ideological Unity × Concentration of Diversity (log) –.229*
(.13)
Regionalist Party –.429*** –.411*** –.402*** –.430***
(.08) (.08) (.08) (.08)
Party Age .000 .000 .000 .000
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
New Democracy (dic) –.047 –.032 –.052 –.013
(.09) (.09) (.07) (.10)
Constant 1.060** 2.049*** 1.366*** 2.891***
(.43) (.53) (.51) (.97)
No. of cases 142 142 142 142
No. of countries 20 20 20 20
Sig:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 9: Models without regional parties (M1) and controlling for regional parties (M2)
Dependent Variable: Party Nationalization M1 M2
Ideological Unity –.130*** –.129***
(.04) (.04)
Leadership Factionalism –.039 –.079**
(.03) (.03)
Party Centralization .035 .050
(.03) (.04)
Party Age .001 .000
(.00) (.00)
Concentration of Diversity (log) –.099 –.155*
(.10) (.08)
Political Decentralization –.032* –.029*
(.02) (.01)
Average District Magnitude (log) (DPI) .040 .030
(.03) (.03)
New Democracy (dic) –.071 .008
(.07) (.06)
Countries with Regional Parties –.057
(.05)
Constant 1.044*** .945***
(.32) (.29)
No. of parties 129 142
No. of countries 20 20
Sig:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 10: Cross-level interactions without regional parties
M1 M2 M3 M4
Ideological Unity –.131*** –.286*** .006 –.393**
(.04) (.09) (.10) (.19)
Leadership Factionalism .054 –.046 –.047 –.037
(.06) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Party Centralization .037 .041 .042 .037
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Political Decentralization .040 –.033* –.026 –.029
(.04) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Concentration of Diversity (log) –.092 –.079 –.095 .471
(.10) (.10) (.10) (.43)
Average District Magnitude (log) (DPI) .043 –.220* .040
(.03) (.13) (.03)
Number of Electoral Districts (log) .126
(.11)
Leadership Factionalism × Political Decentralization –.031*
(.02)
Ideological Unity × Average District Magnitude (log) .073**
(.04)
Ideological Unity × Number of Electoral Districts (log) –.043
(.03)
Ideological Unity × Concentration of Diversity (log) –.144
(.10)
Party Age .001 .001 .001 .001
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
New Democracy (dic) –.069 –.061 –.072 –.050
(.07) (.07) (.07) (.07)
Constant .833** 1.627*** .714 2.052**
(.34) (.42) (.47) (.80)
No. of cases 129 129 129 129
No. of countries 20 20 20 20
Sig:*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Figure 8: Marginal effects of cross-level interactions (sample without regional parties)
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